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Abstract 
In this article, I contend that philosophical reactions against ethno-philosophy, especially the 
arguments by professional African philosophers such as Paulin Hountondji and Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, cannot go unchallenged at a time when Africa is facing a myriad of problems such as 
disease, famine, ethnic conflicts, religious wars, nd natural disasters which, in my view, stem 
from the continent’s failure to reflect on its past in he quest for lasting solutions. Having looked 
at the historical context of the emergence of ethno-philosophy or the project of cultural 
revivalism, and having closely examined the premises presented by Hountondji and Appiah 
against ethno-philosophy - which I consider to be unconvincing because of their tendency to 
glide into Western philosophical forms of thought - I argue that ethno-philosophy is just like 
Western philosophy, as it is based on a recognized form of reasoning, namely inductive 
reasoning, which is packaged in proverbs, riddles and other cultural resources. I also argue that 
religious beliefs are not an obstacle to the development of scientific thought in Africa; rather, 
they are an aid to it since both have complementary rather than opposing roles. 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
As a regular contributor in the area of African philosophy, particularly on its attendant concept 
hunhu/ubuntu, I have had to face hard questions from colleagues at work and those I have met at 
international conferences who have accused me and others that have contributed in this area of 
being too simplistic or overly ambitious in defendig this system of thought as a distinct 
category of African philosophy. While in the past I have argued for the recognition of 
hunhu/ubuntu philosophy in Zimbabwe, in this article I appeal to a different form of argument in 
order to defend ethno-philosophy against what I consider to be an unjustified attack by 
professional African philosophers.1 I attempt to make a case for ethno-philosophy, showing that 
it is a philosophy based on reason and evidence just like Western  philosophy. 
                                                 
1 Professional African Philosophers are identified not only by their credentials as doctors of philosophy from 
Western universities or Western style universities in Africa, but also by a common conviction among them that 
philosophy, in its strictest academic sense, is a universal mode of inquiry. The sort of investigation that Professional 
African Philosophers engage in is often described as a “second order activity” on first order claims to truth about the 
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Recently, as I was carrying out research on ethno-phil sophy, I came across a very interesting 
article by Jay A. Ciaffa titled “Tradition and Modernity in Postcolonial African Philosophy” 
(Ciaffa 2008) which revisited this debate, focusing on the contributions of Hountondji, Appiah 
and Gyekye in their critique of ethno-philosophy. My discovery of this article stimulated my 
interest in replying to those who have charged ethno-philosophy of being uncritical and 
irrational. In my reply to such critics, I do three things: 
(1) Outline familiar objections to ethno-philosophy. 
(2) Offer a critique of these objections. 
(3) Show why ethno-philosophy is a project that is worth pursuing in light of the many 
problems bedeviling Africa today, which, in my view, are due to the failure of Africa to 
harness its philosophy in order to solve them. 
Among the Shona2 of Zimbabwe, there is a proverb which says: Chimwango choumwe hachina 
ndima (A borrowed hoe cannot cover enough ground). This proverb can be used to succinctly 
express the fact that Western philosophies and sciences cannot wholly solve Africa’s problems.  
Ethno-philosophy: A Definition 
Since ethno-philosophy is an aspect of African philosophy, it is important to begin this article by 
defining African philosophy. To this end, K.C. Anyanwu and E.A. Ruch (1981) define African 
philosophy as "that which concerns itself with the way in which African people of the past and 
present make sense of their destiny and of the world in which they live." Understood this way, 
African philosophy becomes that kind of philosophy which must necessarily be produced by 
African people and must use distinct African philosophical methods (Janz 2009, 75-76). 
Imbo (1998, 38-39) notes that although African philosophers are found in the various academic 
fields of philosophy such as metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy and political 
philosophy, much of the modern African philosophy has been concerned with defining ethno-
philosophy as an aspect of African philosophy and identifying what differentiates it from other 
philosophical traditions. In this article, I focus more on the criticisms leveled against ethno-
                                                                                                                                                
world, knowledge, inference and values. As a second order activity, so they claim, philosophy evaluates first order 
claims in order to clarify their meanings and to identify appropriate ways of justifying them. It essentially involves 
reflection, criticism, argument and written peer review (English and Kalumba 1996, 7). 
2 The Shona people constitute the largest linguistic grouping in Zimbabwe which is made up of six dialects, namely, 
Karanga, Korekore, Zezuru, Ndau, Manyika and Kalanga.  
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philosophy by professional African philosophers. Befor  I do this, I define ethno-philosophy. To 
this end, I begin by reviewing the definition by Imbo (1998, 38-39) who provides a somewhat 
general definition of the idea as “the study of indigenous philosophical systems”. In defining 
ethno-philosophy this way, no doubt, Imbo is of the vi w that specific cultures can have 
philosophies that are not applicable and accessible to all peoples and cultures in the world (Imbo 
1998, 38-39). 
Most professional African philosophers have defined ethno-philosophy as the recollection or 
recording of the beliefs found in African cultures (Proteus 2007). Such an approach treats 
African philosophy as consisting in a set of shared b liefs, a shared world-view, an item of 
communal property rather than an activity for the individual (Proteus 2007). 
Zeverin Emagalit (2006) falls into the category of A rican philosophers that see ethno-
philosophy as a (re)collection of oral wisdom. For Emagalit, ethno-philosophy is a system of 
thought that deals with collective world views of diverse African people as a unified form of 
knowledge based on the myths, folk wisdom and proverbs of the people: 
Ethno-philosophy is, …, a specialized and wholly customs dictated philosophy 
that requires a communal consensus. It identifies with the totality of customs and 
common beliefs of a people. It is a folk philosophy (Emagalit 2006). 
This is the kind of position that I challenge in this article. In my view, ethno-philosophy entails 
two tasks, namely, the collection and analysis of indigenous African thought systems. I will 
explain the second task in the last section of this article as I offer a critique of the arguments by 
professional African philosophers. In the next section, I look at the historical context of ethno-
philosophy, with a view to showing that ethno-philosophy is a philosophy about Africa’s quest 
for identity, so that it cannot simply be a collection of indigenous African beliefs, norms, values 
and customs which Appiah and company have called oral f lk philosophy. 
The Historical Context of Ethno-philosophy 
As Ciaffa (2008, 123) observes, “ethno-philosophy has its historical roots in the colonial era, in 
fact it emerged as a response to the European discourse about African culture and identity.” 
Ciaffa maintains that in order to understand the cultural revivalist project, it is necessary to begin 
with some brief remarks on this European discourse (Ciaffa 2008, 124). He begins his account 
by noting that colonialism in Africa was supported by a broad range of popular and scholarly 
literature which highlighted fundamental differences between Europeans and Africans (Ciaffa 
2008, 124). 
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One of the most notorious examples of this literature was the work of the French Anthropologist, 
Lucien Levy-Bruhl, who distinguished between the all ged mentality of the civilized Europeans 
and that of the primitive non-Europeans by arguing that the primitive mentality was pre-logical 
(cited in Offia 2009). Levy-Bruhl described a “pre-logical thought” as one that was unscientific, 
uncritical and containing evident contradictions (cited in Oyeshile 2008, 57). Just like Levy-
Bruhl, G.W.F. Hegel (1956) did not believe that Africans could philosophize and that there was 
something called African philosophy that was worth celebrating. 
Reacting to these Western philosophers, particularly Levy-Bruhl’s attack on the black African, 
Ciaffa noted that the images of the civilized European and primitive African helped sustain the 
idea that colonialism was a fundamentally benevolent enterprise, that is, a venture in which 
Europeans were attempting to bring civilization to the “dark continent” (Ciaffa 2008, 124). As 
Ciaffa notes, it was important for African philosophers to explore and revitalize traditional 
African thought as a basis for their struggle against colonialism (Ciaffa 2008, 125). This is what 
inspired African philosophers - especially ethno-philosophers - to write about the need for 
cultural revivalism. Placide Tempels’ Bantu philosophy provided a template for this noble 
project. This is despite the fact that Tempels’ study of the Bantu people of Congo had been 
viewed as having colonial motives - to facilitate conversion to Christianity. Tempels’ work 
challenged prevailing ideas about the primitive mind as earlier on promulgated by Levy-Bruhl 
and others (Ciaffa 2008, 125). 
Leopold Senghor was among the pioneers of the project of ethno-philosophy through his 
celebrated philosophy of negritude. In apparent reference to the black African, he argued that the 
Negro was a man of nature and was more sensuous and responsive to the rhythms of the 
environment than his white counterpart (Senghor 1995). Senghor has this to say about the 
European’s attitude to nature: 
Whites approached the environment in the manner of a scientist or an engineer 
differentiating themselves from the natural world, placing nature at a distance, so 
to speak. Through this objective stance, the natural world can be surveyed, 
measured and, ultimately, manipulated for human purposes (Senghor 1995). 
Senghor also directly challenged claims of white superiority in his philosophy of negritude as he 
observed that Africans were equal to Europeans. In fact, he objected to the view widely held in 
the West that the Negro lacked reason by arguing that t e Negro had a different form of 
reasoning and a different way of understanding the world (Senghor 1995). For Ciaffa, the goal of 
Senghor and other ethno-philosophers is to mobilize African cultural norms to address 
contemporary problems (Ciaffa 2008, 126). 
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Philosophical reactions to Ethno-philosophy 
In this section I look at the reactions of professional African Philosophers to the project of ethno-
philosophy. In particular, I examine the reactions of two famous professional African 
Philosophers, namely, Paulin J. Hountondji and Kwame Antony Appiah. These two also belong 
to the universalist camp which opposes the Particularist camp’s assertion that philosophy is 
culture-specific. 
Hountondji’s submissions 
Hountondji is without doubt one of the fiercest criti s of ethno-philosophy. He begins his 
critique by noting that African philosophy exists by the same right and in the same mode as all 
the philosophies of the world: in the form of literature whereby African scholars simply make 
use of African traditions and orality and project onto them their own philosophical beliefs 
(Hountondji 1996, 62). Hountondji (1996, 33) observes: “By African philosophy, I mean a set of 
texts, specifically the set of texts written by Africans and described as philosophical by their 
authors themselves.” By this claim, he is suggesting that African Philosophy cannot exist as a 
distinct category of philosophy; instead it is a creation of those Africans who use their 
intellectual powers to see philosophy where there is no philosophy by regarding traditions as 
philosophy. 
By arguing that African philosophy cannot exist as a distinct category, Hountondji is particularly 
reacting to Placide Tempels, who, through his coinage of the phrase Bantu Philosophy, had 
asserted that Africans had a distinct philosophy and Alexis Kagame’s Bantu-Rwandais 
Philosophy which had focused on the philosophy of the Rwandese people. As a reaction to these 
claims, Hountondji (1996, 62) remarks that “both Temp ls and Kagame simply make use of 
African traditions and oral literature and project onto them their own philosophical beliefs, 
hoping to enhance their credibility thereby.” 
For Hountondji, the existence (or lack thereof) of African philosophy depends entirely on 
whether the word philosophy when qualified by the word African retains its habitual meaning, or 
whether the simple addition of an adjective necessarily changes the meaning of the substantive 
(Hountondji 1996, 56). For Hountondji, what is in question then is the universality of the word 
philosophy throughout its possible geographical locations (Hount ndji 1996, 56). He writes: 
This universality must be preserved - not because philosophy must necessarily 
develop the same themes or even ask the same questions from one country or 
continent to another, but because these differences of content which, as such, 
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refer back to the essential unity of a single discipline, of a single style of enquiry 
(Hountondji 1996, 56). 
Hountondji also challenges what he calls the “myth of primitive unanimity”. For him, ethno-
philosophy gives the false impression that in “primitive” societies, that is, non-Western societies, 
people are united on those fundamental issues that define their existence, and there are no 
individual beliefs or philosophies but only a collective system of beliefs (Hountondji 1996, 60). 
For him, the term philosophy is then incorrectly used to refer to such belief systems (Hountondji 
1996, 60). This unity, for Hountondji, is imaginary, as ethno-philosophers want to interpret a 
text which nowhere exists and has to be constantly re-invented; they claim to have a science 
without an object and a discourse that has no referent, so that its falsity can never be 
demonstrated (Hountondji 1996, 62). 
Thus Hountondji’s understanding of ethno-philosophy is that of a study devoid of any 
meaningful philosophy. As earlier observed, this argument is based on his universalist 
understanding of the meaning of the word philosophy as a discipline that is methodical, rational 
and critical. Against this background, Hountondji remarks: 
While they were looking for philosophy in a place where it could never be found 
- in the collective unconscious of African peoples, in the silent folds of their 
explicit discourse - ethno-philosophers never questioned the nature and 
theoretical status of their own analyses (Hountondji 1996, 62). 
Hountondji also thinks that “ethno-philosophy is a pre-philosophy mistaking itself for a meta-
philosophy,3 a philosophy which, instead of presenting its own rational justification, shelters 
lazily behind the authority of tradition and projects its own theses and beliefs onto that tradition” 
(Hountondji 1996, 63). 
Appiah’s position 
In his contribution to the ethno-philosophy debate, in particular the argument on African 
unanimity of thought earlier questioned by Hountondji, Appiah (1992, 26) argues that whatever 
Africans share, they do not have a common traditional culture, common language, or a common 
religious and conceptual vocabulary. In fact, as Appiah puts it, “Africans share too many 
problems to be distracted by a bogus basis for solidarity” (Appiah 1992, 26). 
                                                 
3 Meta-philosophy, for Hountondji, means that philosophy can develop only by reflecting on its history. It also 
means that all new thinkers must be fed on the doctrines of their predecessors…so as to enrich the historical 
heritage available in their own time (1996: 63). 
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Appiah thinks that the absence of unanimity of thought in Africa necessarily weakens arguments 
for the project of ethno-philosophy. The question is: How? In response to this question, Appiah 
argues that unanimity of thought undergirds the project of ethno-philosophy, so that any attack 
on such unanimity is also an attack on the project of ethno-philosophy (Appiah 1992, 95). Note 
that Appiah does not question the existence of folk philosophy in Africa. In fact, he makes the 
following affirmation in regard to the existence of oral folk philosophy in Africa: 
The sense in which there is a philosophical tradition in Africa is…that there is an 
oral folk philosophy whose authority lies largely in its purported antiquity, not the 
quality of the reasoning - or evidence - that sustain  it, and which is usually 
unable to treat critical activity as disinterested (Appiah 1992, 91). 
Just like Hountondji, Appiah’s contention is not that no form of philosophy exists in Africa; his 
problem is the suggestion that ethno-philosophy has t e same status as Western philosophy. 
This, to him, would give the impression that Africans can philosophize the same way as Western 
philosophers. Yet he acknowledges [above] that the hallmark of Western philosophy is the use 
of reason and evidence, two aspects that are glariny absent in oral folk philosophy - at least 
according to him. For Appiah, the designation African philosophy seems to give the impression 
that traditions, customs, norms, beliefs and values in Africa are homogenous. Against this 
background, he writes: 
If ‘Africa’ in ‘African philosophy’ is meant to distinguish a natural kind, there 
seems no terribly good reason for supposing that the answer should be yes. Why 
should the Zulu, the Azande, the Hausa and the Asante have the same concepts or 
the same beliefs about those matters which the concepts are used to think about 
and discuss? It seems they do not. If similarities are expected, it should be on the 
basis of the similarities between economies and social structures of traditional 
society (Appiah 1992, 91). 
Appiah maintains that “many traditional African societies have as much in common with 
traditional societies that are not African as they do with each other, so that there is no reason to 
think that the folk philosophies of Africa are uniform” (Appiah 1992, 92). For Appiah, ethno-
philosophy is only a useful beginning. Why does Appiah take this position? One way to answer 
this question would probably be to say that he is influenced by the position of his 
contemporaries. In fact, Appiah cites Kwasi Wiredu (1980) and Marcien Towa (1971) who also 
mount a full scale attack on ethno-philosophy. He presents Wiredu as having argued that “there 
is no philosophical interest in a recovery and preservation of traditional ideas that is not critical” 
(Wiredu cited in Appiah 1992, 92). He also presents Towa as having argued that “the mere 
accumulation of traditions is a diversion from engagement with the real political issues facing 
Africa, issues her philosophers ought to articulate and address” (Towa cited in Appiah 1992, 92). 
It is critical to note that although Appiah does not explicitly refer to ethno-philosophy as oral 
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folk philosophy, his intuition is that ethno-philosophy is not based on reason and evidence - two 
critical aspects that define Western philosophy. My reason for reaching such a conclusion has to 
do with the claim he makes that “there is no possibility of not bringing a Western philosophical training to 
bear. What we must be careful of is simply projecting Western ideas, along with Western-derived methods, into the 
indigenous conceptual framework” (Appiah 1992, 92). His point is that African philosophy cannot be a 
stand-alone category of philosophy that can compete at the level of other philosophies of the 
world such as British philosophy, American philosophy and Greek philosophy. 
Critical Remarks  
Having outlined the historical context of ethno-philosophy and the reactions to it by two 
professional African philosophers in the previous two sections, in this section I examine what I 
consider to be some of the shortcomings of these arguments. 
From the outline in the previous two sections, it would seem that professional African 
philosophers have problems in elevating ethno-philosophy to the same level as British 
philosophy, American philosophy and Greek philosophy to name just a few of the world’s 
celebrated philosophies. Although they acknowledge that it is some form of philosophy, they are 
quick to point out that it operates at the lowest lve  since it lacks the elements of reason and a 
distinct method. In short, they assert that it lacks the critical component required of any genuine 
philosophy. 
To Hountondji and Appiah, ethno-philosophy is only a recollection of beliefs, customs, values 
and aspirations of a particular group of people. For them, philosophy is the same throughout the 
world, using the same methods and asking the same questions (cf. Hountondji 1996, 56 and 
Appiah 1992, 91-92). The other point they make is that the designation African philosophy is 
problematic given the diversity of African cultures and traditions. To them, what is sensible is to 
talk of oral folk philosophies of these cultures (cf. Hountondji 1996, 62). 
Beginning with the first line of argument presented by these two professional philosophers - the 
view that ethno-philosophy is a collection of beliefs, customs, values and aspirations of a 
particular group of people and lacks the critical component required of any genuine philosophy, 
it would seem to me that for these philosophers, a philosophy can only be genuine if it can go 
beyond a mere collection of beliefs, customs, values and aspirations of a certain group of people. 
While I agree with this submission, I do not quite agree with the position that this applies to 
ethno-philosophy. In my view, ethno-philosophy is not a mere collection of beliefs, customs, 
values and traditions of a particular group of peopl ; it also involves critical analysis of the 
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same. Reasoning involves analyzing the relationships between or among given premises and 
drawing conclusions from them. Thus reasoning - as an analytical task - is a product of two 
mental processes, namely, deduction and induction. In the deductive process, the conclusion 
which is drawn from given premises follows with necessity, while in the inductive process the 
conclusion follows with probability. It is unfortunate that most definitions of ethno-philosophy, 
especially by professional philosophers, have tended to focus on the ‘collection’ task, thereby 
deliberately ignoring the ‘analysis’ task. 
Let me say a little bit more about this ‘analysis’ task of ethno-philosophy. Some people might 
ask: How is it possible that ethno-philosophy can be analytical? If one attempts to understand the 
concept of ‘analysis’ from the perspective of Western thinking which is by and large deductive, 
then there might be a problem. However, if one attempts to understand the same concept in an 
African context, which is by and large inductive, there would not be any problem. I will try to 
make my point clear by explaining what ‘understanding African concepts from an inductive 
point of view’ means, and then I will employ African proverbs4 as illustrations. A piece of 
inductive reasoning obtains when the arguer merely tries to establish the probability of a 
conclusion from given premises. In such an instance, th  premises are intended only to be so 
strong that, if they were true, then it would be unlikely that the conclusion would be false 
(Groarke 2014). Thus the key assumption that governs inductive reasoning is that known cases 
can provide information about unknown cases (Gwaravanda and Masaka 2008, 197). For 
example, if one says that: 
In 2012, about 50 prostitutes died of HIV and AIDS related complications at 
Siboza growth point in Zvishavane. 
in 2013, about 62 prostitutes died of HIV and AIDS related complications at 
Siboza growth point in Zvishavane. 
The person can be justified to conclude that about 70 prostitutes are likely to die  of HIV and 
AIDS related complications at Siboza growth point in Zvishavane in 2014. 
Please note that in inductive reasoning, the conclusion follows with probability. Thus while the 
two premises above show the trend of prostitutes dying of HIV and AIDS related complications 
in the years 2013 to 2014 and the probability that e number of prostitutes dying of HIV and 
AIDS complications is likely to increase slightly in the year to follow, the trend may change if 
                                                 
4 I am aware that an attempt has been made by some of th se professional African philosophers to recommend the 
use of proverbs to move ethno-philosophy to what they call the second order sense of knowledge which is rat onal, 
but I go beyond this recommendation to do the actual an lysis of the same. I believe it is one thing to make a 
recommendation, and quite another to implement the recommendation. 
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there are interventions, say, in the provision of Anti-retroviral therapy or behavior change. 
Whatever the case, the conclusion drawn from these premises follows with probability. 
Another example could be: 
In Zimbabwe, it has rained in November every year for the past four years. 
Therefore, it will rain in Zimbabwe this coming November. 
Again, it is important to see how the arguer is drawing his or her conclusion from the premises. 
After having carefully observed the patterns of rainf ll in Zimbabwe over the past four years and 
having noted that rains usually come in November, the conclusion follows with probability that 
it will rain again this coming November. However, due to climate change, the rains may fall 
before or after November. Nevertheless, a conclusion can be drawn from the provided premises 
that is probably true. 
Let us now consider the issue of African proverbs as illustrations of inductive reasoning. If it 
was difficult, in the first generation of Shona society, to have a person who could live 
successfully without listening to other people’s advice or without seeking help from others, and 
if there were such difficulties again in the second an  third generations of Shona society, then 
one could be justified to argue that even in the prsent generation the Shona proverb, rume 
rimwe harikombi churu (one man cannot surround an anthill) still applies, and it refers to the 
difficulties a person can encounter if he or she dos not seek help or advice from other people in 
order to accomplish an important task. No doubt, this kind of conclusion is reached inductively, 
that is, after a rigorous analysis of the situation as it obtained in the first generation of Shona 
society. The job of the ethno-philosopher, then, would be to collect and analyze these proverbs 
to see if philosophical thinking can be mined from them. 
Another instance of inductive reasoning is seen in the conceptualization of the proverb: Paduku 
paduku hapadzokwi (It does not matter how small the area covered is in completing a task, that 
small area will never be repeated). This points to the fact that the accomplishment of a big task is 
a step by step process, and that a preceding step will never be repeated and yet it will contribute 
to the completion of the task. Note that proverbs are not only characteristic of the nature of 
ethno-philosophy among the Shona of Zimbabwe: they ar  to be found across the breadth and 
width of black Africa. 
E.A Alagoa of Nigeria (cited in King 2007, 3) argues that the existence of an African philosophy 
of history stems from traditional proverbs, and that age is an important factor in gaining wisdom 
and interpreting the past. To illustrate this point, he cites the proverbs: “More days, more 
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wisdom” and “what an old man sees while seated, a youth does not see standing” (Cited in King 
2007, 3). No doubt, these proverbs are used to show t e veritable nature of ethno-philosophy. 
Just like Shona proverbs, these Nigerian proverbs ae an outcome of a rigorous process of 
analysis of past events and how they have had an impact on the present, and how they are likely 
to have an impact on the future. Reason is crucial in this process of analysis. Against this 
background, it will be misleading for Professional African philosophers to suggest that ethno-
philosophy is not based on reason. 
Gwaravanda and Masaka (2008, 197) make use of the Shona word Zvirahwe (riddles) to 
illustrate that ethno-philosophy is based on inductive reasoning. For them, the type of inductive 
reasoning used in Shona riddles is the argument from analogy which is defined by Horner and 
Westacott (2000, 66) as a similarity between two things or situations. An example of an analogy 
is comparing mbeu (seed) germinating from the soil and mwana (baby) coming out of its 
mother’s womb, noting the points of similarity and difference. Thus a person could come up 
with the following expression referring to his or her child who is born without any deformities: 
mbeu yangu yamera isina kuremara (my seed has germinated well). 
As Gwaravanda and Masaka (2008, 197) maintain, the S ona closely observe a relevant 
similarity between the clue to a given riddle and the answer to the riddle. This kind of 
observation cannot obtain without invoking rational powers to arrive at the solution of the riddle. 
To make use of analogical reasoning in the context of riddles, the Shona reflect on both 
similarities and differences and discern how relevant they are in arriving at the solution to the 
riddle (Gwaravanda and Masaka 2008, 197). 
Based on the considerations above, it is evident that reason is characteristic of ethno-philosophy. 
In fact, as Ramose (1999, 42) observes, “there is no o tological defect among indigenous 
African people by virtue of which they may be excluded from the membership of Homo 
sapiens.” If this is granted, it follows that Africans who have, for years, defended ethno-
philosophy are justified in maintaining that it is a genuine philosophy. Thus claims by 
Hountondji and Appiah that ethno-philosophy is not based on reason and evidence cannot be 
justified. 
The claim by Hountondji (1996, 56) that philosophy must have the same themes and must ask 
the same questions across cultures cannot go unchallenged. The questions to be asked are 
entirely determined by a people’s existential circumstances, their world view as well as their 
geographical location. These factors cannot be the same across cultures. For instance, the fact 
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that Africa is currently facing the challenges that ve to do with ethnic conflicts, disease and 
economic disorder means that Africa is grappling with questions that relate to these particular 
challenges, and these questions are probably not being asked in Europe and North America, for 
example. Consequently, to dismiss ethno-philosophy on the basis that it has a different sort of 
questions to ask as compared to those questions that Western philosophy is currently asking will 
be grossly inappropriate. 
Since most African countries were once colonies of Europe, and since the European colonisers, 
to a large extent, are responsible for the decimation of African cultures through their policies of 
assimilation and adoption, Africa needs to be united n order to embrace its own philosophy 
which is none other than ethno-philosophy. While th opportunities, experiences and challenges 
of each country may be different depending on who colonized them and the resources they 
possess, the facts of wars, hunger, diseases and religious imperialism5 are common across 
Africa, and ought to constitute the source of the unanimity. 
Thus unanimity has to do with the acceptance by African nation-states that they have serious 
challenges emanating from their colonial past, and the project of ethno-philosophy is meant to 
find solutions to these challenges. Thus unanimity cannot be a myth and cannot be imaginary - 
as Hountondji and Appiah would have us believe- since it is based on the African people’s 
existential experiences and realities. There have be n wars, poverty, hunger and diseases in 
South Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali and Ivory Coast in recent years, 
and these problems have moved African countries to work together in search of solutions. 
Countries such as Zimbabwe, South Africa and Mozambique have sent peace-keeping missions 
to these troubled spots as a sign of solidarity, a gesture that is in keeping with the philosophy of 
ubuntu which says: “there is no way an individual can be healthy when the community is sick” 
(Yamamoto 1997, 52). This can be rephrased to read: “there is no way one African country can 
be peaceful when other African countries have wars.” Thus to suggest, as Appiah (1992, 26) 
does, that “Africans share too many problems to be distracted by a bogus basis for solidarity” is 
to miss the point altogether. 
The things that matter in Africa are unity, peace, shelter, health, education and food, among 
others. When it comes to these things, Africans of black extraction are really united. Appiah also 
runs the risk of hasty generalisation when he argues that Africans do not share things such as 
common language (Appiah 1992, 26). The Bantu people, who Tempels wrote about in his classic 
                                                 
5 By religious imperialism, I mean the demonization of indigenous religions by the imperialists in order to promote 
the spread of foreign religions such as Christianity, Islam and others.  
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book, Bantu Philosophy, are united by the Bantu language which is found i Southern and 
Eastern Africa that include countries such as Zimbabwe, South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda. The languages may not 
explicitly be the same, but they have a lot in common. For example, in Zimbabwe a person is 
called munhu/umuntu; in South Africa the word is umuntu and in Botswana the word is muthu. 
Appiah’s assertion that African societies have much in common with traditional societies that 
are not African as they do with each other is, to me, a claim which cannot be validated. In fact, 
African societies have a lot of things in common, oe of which is the idea of community and 
peaceful co-existence. This idea runs across almost all African societies, although it is known by 
different names. In Southern Africa it is known as hunhu/ubuntu/botho, while in some Western 
African countries such as Ghana it is known as okra; and among the Igbo of Nigeria it is called 
umunna (Egwutuorah 2013, 411; Mangena 2015, 7). The idea is that community interests come 
before individual ones. What this means is that the achievements of the individual are only 
important if they lead to the betterment of the community as a whole (cf. Ramose 1999; 
Mangena 2012a; Mangena 2012b; Gade 2011). Thus the Shona people of Zimbabwe say munhu 
munhu muvanhu; in isiNdebele and Zulu language of Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively 
they say umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, and both sayings translate into English as “a person is a 
person through other persons” (cf. Mangena 2012a; Mangena 2012b; Shutte 2008; Tutu 1999). 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have argued for the need to respect ethno-philosophy as an authentic philosophy 
at the same level with British philosophy, American philosophy, and Greek philosophy, to name 
a few of the so-called genuine philosophies of the world. Citing examples from Zimbabwe and 
Nigeria, I have sought to illustrate, through the use of proverbs and riddles, that ethno-
philosophy is based on reason and evidence. I have argued that it was grossly unfair for 
professional African philosophers such as Hountondji and Appiah to treat ethno-philosophy as 
merely a collection of beliefs, customs, values andtra itions of a people. I am convinced that in 
the process, I have succeeded in replying to my critics - old and new - with regard to the need to 
treat ethno-philosophy with utmost respect. 
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